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Abstract
This paper revisits optimal monetary policy in open economies, in particu-
lar, focusing on the noncooperative policy game under local currency pricing in
a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We first derive the
quadratic loss functions which noncooperative policy makers aim to minimize.
Then, we show that noncooperative policy makers face extra trade-offs regarding
stabilizing real marginal costs induced by deviations from the law of one price
under local currency pricing, and that optimal monetary policy seeks to stabilize
CPI inflation rates and more so under noncooperation than it does under cooper-
ation. As a result of the increased number of stabilizing objectives, welfare gains
from cooperation emerge even when two countries face only technology shocks.
Still, gains from cooperation are not large, implying that frictions other than nom-
inal rigidities are necessary to strongly recommend cooperation as an important
policy framework to increase global welfare.
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1 Introduction
In a world of integrated trade in goods and assets, sovereign nations become more
and more interdependent. The prolonged recession after the Global Financial Crisis
again reminds policy makers in major economies of the depth and scope of such inter-
relations. Understanding the nature of cross-country spillovers of shocks and policy
impacts comes back to center stage in policy discussions. Should central banks co-
operate in order to internalize the possible externality from policy reactions? Is there
any gain from such cooperation? And if so, how large might it be?
The desirability of policy cooperation, namely whether there exist gains from co-
operation, has been one of the central issues in macroeconomics. The root of the dis-
cussion can be traced way back to Hume (1752), who first noticed possible policy
spillovers among countries. Since then, there have been a vast number of studies in-
vestigating the nature of policy games in open economies. Recently, many have stud-
ied optimal monetary policy in open economies using microfounded, open-economy
sticky-price models based on the so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics
(hereafter, NOEM) initiated by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Svensson and van Wi-
jnbergen (1989). Contrary to traditional studies using the Mundell-Fleming model,
correct welfare can be computed with the NOEM models. Thus, comparison of dif-
ferent policies becomes possible without resort to ad hoc criteria.
This paper revisits optimal monetary policy in open economies in a new direction,
which is a noncooperative game under local currency pricing (hereafter, LCP). The
motivations behind seeking optimal noncooperative monetary policy under LCP are
twofold: one is positive and the other is normative. The former arises because exchange
rate pass-through is imperfect. There are numerous empirical studies which point out
significant deviation from the law of one price. To name a few, Isard (1977), among
early studies on this issue, presents evidence that “the law of one price is flagrantly
and systematically violated.” Knetter (1993) reports that “Japanese and German ex-
porters use destination-specific markup adjustment to stabilize local-currency prices
of exports.” Goldberg and Knetter (1997) offer a comprehensive survey of early lit-
erature on empirical evidence that “the local currency prices of foreign products do
not respond fully to exchange rates.” Engel (1999) shows that “relative prices of non-
traded goods appear to account for almost none of the movement of U.S. real ex-
change rates,” implying that there are significant fluctuations in the relative prices
of traded goods. A recent study by Atkeson and Burstein (2008) provides new evi-
dence using individual prices: “the terms of trade for manufactured goods are signif-
icantly less volatile than the manufacturing PPI-based real exchange rate; and that the
CPI-based real exchange rate for goods has roughly the same volatility as the manu-
facturing PPI-based real exchange rate.” These two findings support their modeling
strategy to put emphasis on “the decisions of individual firms to price-to-market.”
The latter motivation will be discussed in detail in the next subsection, and is il-
lustrated diagrammatically in Table 1. Optimal monetary policy in open economies
has been investigated under many different settings in the NOEM, such as under
cooperation or noncooperation, producer currency pricing (hereafter, PCP) or LCP,
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Table 1: Taxonomy of optimal monetary policy in open economies
Games
Pricing PCP LCP
Cooperation
one-period
ahead
OR (1995), OR (2002)
one-period
ahead
DE (2003), CP (2005a)
staggered
CGG (2002), BB
(2003), BB (2006)
staggered Engel (2011)
Noncooperation
one-period
ahead
CP (2001), OR (2002)
one-period
ahead
DE (2003), CP (2005a)
staggered
CGG (2002), BB
(2003), BB (2006)
staggered This Paper (2017)
Note: OR denotes Obstfeld and Rogoff, CP denotes Corsetti and Pesenti, CGG denotes Clarida, Galı´
and Gertler, BB denotes Benigno and Benigno, and DE denotes Devereux and Engel.
and with or without home bias. Consequently, our understanding of how monetary
policy should be conducted in an interconnected world is deepened. There is, how-
ever, one last missing piece, which has not yet been analyzed in a theoretical dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (hereafter, DSGE) model. That is, how optimal nonco-
operative monetary policy under LCP should be conducted, or whether there are any
gains from cooperation under LCP. These are the questions to which we aim to give
answers in this paper.
For this purpose, we first solve the equilibrium conditions under monopolistic
competition, sticky prices and LCP in a two-country model. The Ramsey (determinis-
tic) steady states under both cooperative and noncooperative regimes are at globally
efficient levels and identical to those under the flexible-price equilibrium. Thus, the
exact welfare comparison between cooperation and noncooperation becomes possi-
ble. Then, we approximate welfare around this deterministic steady state up to the
second order. In a noncooperative regime, even if the steady state is efficient thanks to
the optimal subsidy, linear terms cannot be eliminated. Following Sutherland (2002),
Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno and Benigno (2006), we take a second-
order approximation to the structural equations to substitute out the linear terms with
only second-order terms. Correct welfare metrics up to the second-order approxima-
tion are thus obtained.
Our loss functions under LCP show that noncooperative policy makers naturally
aim to stabilize variables whose fluctuations are to be minimized by cooperative pol-
icy makers as analyzed in Engel (2011), including output, producer price index (here-
after, PPI) inflation rates, import price inflation rates, and deviations from the law of
one price.1 In addition, they also seek to stabilize fluctuations in real marginal costs
that firms face when setting prices in both domestic and export markets. These ad-
ditional objectives are unique to the noncooperative game and therefore the sources
for potential gains from cooperation, which are absent in previous studies on optimal
1Note that last terms are not considered under PCP, since the law of one price holds.
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monetary policy in open economies.2
Then, in order to clarify the nature of optimal monetary policy in open economies,
we compare impulse responses under optimal monetary policies among three cases:
(1) PCP; (2) cooperative regime and LCP; (3) noncooperative regime and LCP. Note
that in our setting with only technology shocks, optimal cooperative as well as non-
cooperative policies result in identical allocations and prices under PCP.
Fluctuations in consumer price index (hereafter, CPI) inflation rates become smaller
under LCP than under PCP. This is because the violation of the law of one price in-
duces inefficient price dispersions within producer as well as export prices, as empha-
sized by Engel (2011). As a result, the “inward-looking” policy that focuses on stabi-
lization of PPI inflation rates is no more optimal under LCP. In addition, under LCP,
noncooperative policy makers stabilize CPI inflation rates more than cooperative cen-
tral banks do. This larger stabilization motive arises from the unique objectives in the
loss functions under noncooperation. Inability to cooperate constrains the dynamics
toward more efficient outcomes. Reactions of domestic output to a domestic tech-
nology shock become smaller under noncooperation. Without any frictions, global
welfare increases when production in the country with favorable efficiency shocks
increases. This difference in the responses of output creates room for cooperative
policies to improve global welfare.
We also compute the welfare gain from cooperation under LCP by solving the non-
linear Ramsey problem. Welfare gains from cooperation are largest with log utility
even though both countries become insular in structural equations under PCP. Still,
welfare gains computed from nonlinear Ramsey problems are not sizable with only
technology shocks. Within the reasonable range of parameter calibration, the wel-
fare cost stemming from the inability to cooperate can only be, at most, 0.04 per cent
in consumption units, in response to one standard deviation of technology shocks.
Corsetti (2008) remarks that in early leading studies, the quantitative assessment of
welfare gains from cooperation is found far from sufficient to justify cooperation, and
whether this result still holds in richer models is a critical research question. Our
paper finds that given only price rigidities, sizable welfare gains may not arise from
cooperation.
1.1 Literature Review
First, we classify previous studies of optimal monetary policy in open economies by
three dimensions.3 The first dimension regards assumptions about nominal rigidi-
ties, that is, either one-period ahead price setting or staggered price setting a` la Calvo
(1983). In early studies using one-period ahead price setting, analytical solutions can
be obtained with money supply as the control variable of monetary policy. With stag-
2Technically, these additional objectives arise from the linear terms in the second-order approxi-
mated welfare, that are eventually substituted by second-order approximated aggregate supply condi-
tions.
3Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) offer a comprehensive survey of optimal monetary policy in
open economies including other aspects such as financial market imperfections.
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gered price setting, central banks maximize correctly approximated social welfare up
to the second order subject to the linearly approximated structural equations. The
second dimension is about export price setting, namely PCP or LCP. In the former,
export prices fully reflect exchange rate fluctuations, while not at all in the latter. The
third dimension is whether monetary policy in open economies is conducted in a co-
operative or noncooperative manner.
Table 1 offers a taxonomy of previous studies on optimal monetary policy in open
economies. Regarded as the beginning of the NOEM framework for monetary pol-
icy analysis in open economies, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) develop a micro-founded
two-country model with PCP and a one-period in advance price setting rule. Mon-
etary expansion in any country increases social welfare globally. Thus, there is no
scope for policy cooperation. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) extend the model of Obst-
feld and Rogoff (1995) by assuming different elasticities of substitution within and
across goods categories.4 A domestic monetary expansion can be either beggar-thy-
neighbor or beggar-thyself depending on the elasticity of substitution, giving rise to
national policy makers’ incentives to manipulate the terms of trade in favor of their
own welfare. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) assume the existence of the nontradable
sector for their examination of international cooperation under PCP. When nominal
stickiness has little interaction with real distortions, welfare gains from cooperation
are relatively small.
Devereux and Engel (2003) assume LCP while keeping the price setting in the
period-by-period basis. The flexible exchange rate regime is no longer optimal un-
der LCP. Distortions stemming from the violation of the law of one price should be
corrected by restricting the fluctuations of nominal exchange rates. Corsetti and Pe-
senti (2005a) propose a unifying approach to model the exchange rate pass-through in
which PCP and LCP are two extreme cases of the parameterization. No welfare gains
from cooperation are found under either complete or no exchange rate pass-through.
In general cases with partial exchange rate pass-through they argue that a country can
do better than “keeping one’s house in order”.
Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2006) all assume the
staggered price adjustment rule a` la Calvo (1983) and obtain quadratic loss functions
under cooperation as well as noncooperation under PCP. Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler
(2002) choose output as policy variables. The linear terms in the second-order approx-
imation of the utility function are eliminated by strategic use of a sales subsidy. As
a result, Ramsey steady states become different between cooperation and noncooper-
ation. On the other hand, they are set to be identical in Benigno and Benigno (2003,
2006). Benigno and Benigno (2003) derive the quadratic loss function under nonco-
operation using the fact that price stability turns out to be optimal monetary policy.
Benigno and Benigno (2006) make use of second-order approximations of the struc-
tural equations to substitute out those linear terms following Sutherland (2002) and
Benigno and Woodford (2005). Besides the methodological differences, these three
studies also take on different focuses on the implications of optimal policy analysis.
4For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Tille (2001).
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Specifically, Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (2002) appraise the potential gains from cooper-
ation arising from internalizing the terms-of-trade externalities. Benigno and Benigno
(2003) explore the theoretical conditions under which flexible-price allocations are op-
timal, and cooperative and noncooperative allocations coincide under PCP. Finally,
Benigno and Benigno (2006) show how to design simple rules for noncooperative
policy makers to achieve cooperative allocations in the linear-quadratic framework.
Engel (2011) incorporates the staggered price setting rule for optimal monetary
analysis under LCP and the cooperative regime. Home bias in consumption prefer-
ences is also assumed. With home bias, central banks face a trade-off between the
costs of currency misalignment and the stabilization of asymmetric output fluctu-
ations. The derived quadratic global loss function highlights international relative
price misalignments stemming from the violation of the law of one price under LCP.
Thus, optimal cooperative policy under LCP should trade off these misalignments
with inflation and output goals, and should target CPI inflation rates rather than just
PPI inflation rates. Our paper is an extension of Engel (2011) to the noncooperative
game, providing the final block of the class of the NOEM literature as summarized in
Table 1.
Several recent studies provide new insights on different dimensions of the mon-
etary policy game. Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) review previous studies on
optimal monetary policy in open economies with incomplete financial markets. The
targeting rules, which central banks in open economies should follow, may allow de-
viations from allocations and prices under optimal risk sharing. Senay and Suther-
land (2007, 2013) show that the timing of trading in asset markets relative to policy
decisions matters to optimal policy design in open economies. If policy decisions are
made before asset trading takes place, information about the policy decision must be
incorporated in the risk sharing condition. In above-mentioned studies on optimal
monetary policy in open economies, the opposite timing assumption is usually but
implicitly assumed. There, the risk sharing condition becomes independent of pol-
icy making. Although the differences in optimal policies between cooperation and
noncooperation are not discussed in Senay and Sutherland (2007, 2013), the timing of
asset trading offers new insights on possible gains from cooperation. Engel (2016) is
among the first attempts to investigate these issues altogether, namely the differences
between cooperation and noncooperation under both complete and incomplete mar-
kets, where state contingent assets are traded after policy making.5 It is shown that
“optimal policy, even under complete financial markets and cooperation, does not try
to minimize spillovers.” The spillovers under optimal policy are different between
cooperation and noncooperation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the model and
derives equilibrium conditions. Section 3 sets up optimal policy problems in both
nonlinear and linear-quadratic frameworks. Quadratic loss functions under LCP and
noncooperation are derived. Section 4 compares impulse responses under both games
and computes welfare costs stemming from noncooperation. Section 5 concludes.
5Engel (2016) terms this “commitment policy.”
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2 The Model
The model is close to the one considered in Engel (2011). There are two countries
of equal size, Home and Foreign, each populated with a continuum of households
with population size normalized to unity. Agents in the two countries consume both
home goods and foreign goods but have a symmetric home bias. Households sup-
ply labor services to firms within their own country via a competitive labor market.
Households are also the owner of domestic firms. Firms maximize profits in a monop-
olistically competitive market using labor as the only input according to aggregate
technology. Governments levy a lump-sum tax on households and subsidize firms to
eliminate steady state distortions from monopolistic competition. Central banks are
benevolent and aim to maximize social welfare through either cooperation or nonco-
operation.
2.1 Households
A representative household in the home country maximizes
WH,t0 ≡ Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u (Ct)− v (ht)] (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint:
Et [mt,t+1At+1] + Bt+1 + PtCt ≤ At + (1 + it−1) Bt + Wtht + Πt + Tt,
for t ≥ t0, where the consumption aggregator Ct, the aggregate consumption of locally
produced goods CH,t, and the aggregate consumption of imported goods CF,t is given
by
Ct = C
ν
2
H,tC
1− ν2
F,t , (2.2)
CH,t =
[∫ 1
0
CH,t (j)
1− 1ε dj
] ε
ε−1
, (2.3)
CF,t =
[∫ 1
0
CF,t (j∗)1−
1
ε dj∗
] ε
ε−1
, (2.4)
respectively. u (.) is the period utility function, increasing and concave in consump-
tion. v (.) is the period disutility function, increasing and convex in labor ht (measured
by working hours). Wt denotes the nominal wage. At+1 denotes the holdings of the
state contingent (Arrow) securities at the end of period t denominated in the domestic
currency, which equates the marginal rates of substitutions of two countries even ex
post. mt,t+1 denotes the price of the Arrow securities in period t which gives an unitary
return in period t + 1. Bt is the amount of one-period risk-free nominal bonds held at
the beginning of period t with net rate of return it−1. Πt represents the dividend from
7
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
the ownership of firms. Tt represents the lump-sum tax levied by the government. β
is the discount factor. e denotes the elasticity of substitution among differentiated va-
rieties within each country. ν ∈ [0, 2] determines the (symmetric) home bias. When ν
is larger (smaller) than unity, consumer preference exhibits home (foreign) bias. There
is no home bias when ν equals unity. CH,t (j) and CF,t (j∗) denote the home represen-
tative household’s consumption of the goods produced by the home firm j and the
foreign firm j∗, respectively. Note that CPI Pt, PPI PH,t, and the import price index
PF,t are defined by the Lagrange multipliers on equations (2.2) to (2.4) as constraints
in the respective total cost (consumption expenditure) minimization problems. A rep-
resentative household in the foreign country solves a similar optimization problem to
maximize
WF,t0 ≡ Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u (C∗t )− v (h∗t )] . (2.5)
2.2 Firms
Firm j in the home country sets prices in a monopolistically competitive market to
maximize the present discounted value of profits:
Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
θt−t0mt0,tΠt (j) ,
where
Πt (j) = (1 + τ) PH,t(j)CH,t(j) + (1 + τ) StP∗H,t(j)C
∗
H,t(j)−Wtht (j)
subject to the production function:
Yt (j) = exp (zt) ht (j) , (2.6)
and the resource constraint:
Yt (j) = CH,t(j) + C∗H,t(j). (2.7)
St denotes the nominal exchange rate of the foreign currency in units of the home cur-
rency. τ represents the government subsidy rate. Firm j produces Yt (j) of the product
by hiring ht (j) of labor service from the domestic households according to aggregate
production technology exp (zt), where zt follows an AR(1) exogenous process. Firms
set their optimal prices in a staggered manner a` la Calvo (1983). In each period, firms
can only re-optimize prices with 1 − θ. Note that the Lagrange multiplier on a con-
straint where the production function in equation (2.6) and the resource constraint in
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equation (2.7) are combined represents nominal marginal costs:
NMCt =
Wt
exp (zt)
.
There is no firm specificity in marginal costs.
Regarding the export price, there are two types of price setting. Under PCP, firms
fully reflect changes in exchange rates in export prices. Thus, the law of one price
holds:
PH,t(j) = StP∗H,t(j).
On the other hand, under LCP, firms faces the same Calvo (1983) friction even when
setting export prices. As a result, firm j reoptimizes both PH,t(j) and P∗H,t(j) in order
to maximize profits.6
Firm j∗ in the foreign country solves a similar profit maximization problem.
2.3 Governments and Central Banks
The government in each country collects a lump sum tax from households and subsi-
dizes firms to eliminate steady state distortions stemming from monopolistic compe-
tition globally.7 Thus, the subsidy rate is given by
τ =
1
e− 1.
Governments’ budget constraints are
Tt = τ
∫ 1
0
[
PH,t(j)CH,t(j) + StP∗H,t(j)C
∗
H,t(j)
]
dj,
T∗t = τ
∫ 1
0
[
PF,t(j∗)
St
CF,t(j∗) + P∗F,t(j
∗)C∗F,t(j
∗)
]
dj∗.
Balanced budgets are always achieved for the two governments.
Benevolent central banks aim to maximize social welfare as Ramsey planners. We
consider two cases: in the first case, both central banks cooperate to maximize global
welfare; in the second case, each maximizes social welfare in its own country in a
noncooperative game. Details of optimal policies will be discussed later.
6We do not consider interim cases as in Monacelli (2005).
7There is no strategic interaction between the governments.
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2.4 Aggregate Conditions
Taking the integral of equation (2.6) over j gives the aggregate production function of
the home country:
Yt = exp (zt) ht.
Taking the integral of the resource constraint equation (2.7) over j and making use of
the Hicksian demand functions for good j by consumers in both countries gives the
aggregate resource constraint of the home country:
Yt = CH,tΔH,t + C∗H,tΔ
∗
H,t,
where ΔH,t ≡
∫ 1
0
[
PH,t(j)
PH,t
]−e
dj and Δ∗H,t ≡
∫ 1
0
[ P∗H,t(j)
P∗H,t
]−e
dj are the price dispersion
terms. (Derivation of the Hicksian demand functions is in Appendix C.) The foreign
country has an analogous production function and resource constraint.
We assume a complete assets market, and thus trades in the Arrow securities
equate the marginal rates of substitution between two countries even ex post:8
u′ (Ct+1)
u′ (Ct)
Pt
Pt+1
=
u′
(
C∗t+1
)
u′ (C∗t )
StP∗t
St+1P∗t+1
.
With the assumption of the symmetric initial conditions of wealth and that asset
trades take place before the announcement of policy, the standard risk sharing condi-
tion is obtained as follows:
u′ (C∗t ) = etu′ (Ct) ,
where we define the real exchange rate:
et ≡ StP
∗
t
Pt
.
Note that et is unity only when purchasing power parity (PPP) holds (i.e. identical
consumption preferences and under PCP). Otherwise it is time-varying either because
of the non-identical consumption preferences under PCP, or due to imperfect pass-
through under LCP.
8For implications of incomplete international financial markets for the monetary policy game, see
Engel (2016).
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2.4.1 Gains from Price Stability
Under PCP,
Δ∗H,t ≡
∫ 1
0
[
StP∗H,t(j)
StP∗H,t
]−e
dj = ΔH,t.
The resource constraint and production function becomes
CH,t + C∗H,t = Δ
−1
H,tYt = Δ
−1
H,texp (zt) ht.
Price dispersion stemming from staggered price contracts becomes distortionary and
works as if it were a negative technology shock. Thus, welfare can be enhanced by
achieving price stability, namely PH,t(j) = PH,t, P∗H,t(j) = P
∗
H,t or ΔH,t = Δ
∗
H,t = 1.
2.5 Equilibrium Conditions
The home representative household’s period utility is specified as
u (Ct) ≡ C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ ,
v (ht) ≡ χ h
1+ω
t
1 + ω
.
The system of equations consists of the first-order necessary conditions from solv-
ing households’ as well as firms’ optimization problem together with market clear-
ing conditions. All nominal variables are detrended as follows: pH,t ≡ PH,t/Pt,
p∗H,t ≡ P∗H,t/P∗t , pF,t ≡ PF,t/Pt, p∗F,t ≡ P∗F,t/P∗t , πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1, π∗t ≡ P∗t /P∗t−1, πH,t ≡
PH,t/PH,t−1, π∗H,t ≡ P∗H,t/P∗H,t−1, πF,t ≡ PF,t/PF,t−1, π∗F,t ≡ P∗F,t/P∗F,t−1, MCt ≡ NMCt/Pt,
MC∗t ≡ NMC∗t /P∗t , wt ≡ Wt/Pt and w∗t ≡ W∗t /P∗t . Thus the system of equilibrium
conditions is summarized in Table 2.
These equations together with monetary policy rules solve the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium. Equations (xi) to (xiii), (xiv) to (xvi), (xxix) to (xxxi) and (xxxii) to
(xxxiv), which are derived from firms’ profit maximization problems, represent the
New Keynesian Phillips curves for pH, p∗H, pF and p
∗
F, respectively. Ks and Fs are
auxiliary variables, the details of which are shown in Appendix C.
Under PCP, equations (xiv) to (xvi) and (xxix) to (xxxi) collapse to
(xxxviii) p∗H,t =
pH,t
et
,
(xxxix) pF,t = et p∗F,t,
and equations (x) and (xxvii) are replaced by
(xxxx) Δ∗H,t = ΔH,t,
(xxxxi) ΔF,t = Δ∗F,t.
11
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Table 2: Equilibrium conditions
Home Foreign
(i) C−σt = βEt
1+it
πt+1
C−σt+1, (xix) (C
∗
t )
−σ = βEt
1+i∗t
π∗t+1
(
C∗t+1
)−σ ,
(ii) χh
ω
t
C−σt
= wt, (xx)
χ(h∗t )
ω
(C∗t )
−σ = w∗t ,
(iii) CH,t = ν2 p
−1
H,tCt, (xxi) C
∗
H,t =
(
1− ν2
)
p∗−1H,t C
∗
t ,
(iv) CF,t =
(
1− ν2
)
p−1F,t Ct, (xxii) C
∗
F,t =
ν
2 p
∗−1
F,t C
∗
t ,
(v) p
ν
2
H,t p
1− ν2
F,t =
(
ν
2
) ν
2
(
1− ν2
)1− ν2 , (xxiii) (p∗H,t)1− ν2 (p∗F,t) ν2 = ( ν2) ν2 (1− ν2)1− ν2 ,
(vi) MCt = wtexp(zt) , (xxiv) MC
∗
t =
w∗t
exp(z∗t )
,
(vii) exp (zt) ht = CH,tΔH,t + C∗H,tΔ
∗
H,t, (xxv) exp (z
∗
t ) h
∗
t = CF,tΔF,t + C
∗
F,tΔ
∗
F,t,
(viii) Yt = exp (zt) ht, (xxvi) Y∗t = exp (z∗t ) h∗t ,
(ix) ΔH,t = (1− θ)
(
1−θπe−1H,t
1−θ
) e
e−1
(xxvii) ΔF,t = (1− θ)
(
1−θπe−1F,t
1−θ
) e
e−1
+θπeH,tΔH,t−1, +θπ
e
F,tΔF,t−1,
(x) Δ∗H,t = (1− θ)
(
1−θπ∗e−1H,t
1−θ
) e
e−1
(xxviii) Δ∗F,t = (1− θ)
[
1−θ(π∗F,t)
e−1
1−θ
] e
e−1
+θ
(
π∗H,t
)e Δ∗H,t−1, +θ (π∗F,t)e Δ∗F,t−1,
(xi) KH,t = FH,t
[
1−θ(πH,t)e−1
1−θ
] 1
1−e
, (xxix) KF,t = FF,t
[
1−θ(πF,t)e−1
1−θ
] 1
1−e
,
(xii) KH,t =
CH,t MCt
et
(xxx) KF,t = etCF,t MC∗t
+βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
πeH,t+1KH,t+1, +βθEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σt et+1
πeF,t+1KF,t+1,
(xiii) FH,t =
CH,t pH,t
et (xxxi) FF,t = CF,t pF,t
+βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
πe−1H,t+1FH,t+1, +βθEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σt et+1
πe−1F,t+1FF,t+1,
(xiv) K∗H,t = F
∗
H,t
[
1−θ(π∗H,t)
e−1
1−θ
] 1
1−e
, (xxxii) K∗F,t = F
∗
F,t
[
1−θ(π∗F,t)
e−1
1−θ
] 1
1−e
,
(xv) K∗H,t =
C∗H,t MCt
et (xxxiii) K
∗
F,t = etC
∗
F,t MC
∗
t
+βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
(
π∗H,t+1
)e
K∗H,t+1, +βθEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σt et+1
(
π∗F,t+1
)e
K∗F,t+1,
(xvi) F∗H,t = C
∗
H,t p
∗
H,t (xxxiv) F
∗
F,t = etC
∗
F,t p
∗
F,t
+βθEt
C−σt+1et+1
C−σt et
(
π∗H,t+1
)e−1
F∗H,t+1, +βθEt
C∗−σt+1 et
C∗−σt et+1
(
π∗F,t+1
)e−1
F∗F,t+1,
(xvii) πH,t = πt
pH,t
pH,t−1 , (xxxv) πF,t = πt
pF,t
pF,t−1 ,
(xviii) π∗H,t = π
∗
t
p∗H,t
p∗H,t−1
, (xxxvi) π∗F,t = π
∗
t
p∗F,t
p∗F,t−1
,
(xxxvii) (C∗t )
−σ = etC−σt .
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3 Optimal Monetary Policy in Open Economies
In this section, we first set up the Ramsey problem. Optimal monetary policy under
noncooperation is derived in an open-loop Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive the
quadratic loss functions which central banks aim to minimize by the second-order
approximation to social welfare around the Ramsey steady state.
3.1 Ramsey Policy Problems
Central banks under cooperation maximize global welfare:
WW,t0 = WH,t0 + WF,t0 ,
subject to the nonlinear equilibrium conditions in equations (i) to (xxxvii).
On the other hand, under noncooperation, the domestic central bank maximizes
equation (2.1) subject to equations (i) to (xxxvii) given {π∗F,t}∞t=t0 , while the foreign
central bank maximizes equation (2.5) subject to equations (i) to (xxxvii) given {πH,t}∞t=t0 .
The equilibrium conditions of the Ramsey policy under both cooperation and nonco-
operation are shown in Appendix D. The choice of the policy variables taken as given
in a noncooperative game is crucial in determining the equilibrium.9 We follow Be-
nigno and Benigno (2006) and choose PPI inflation rates as the policy variables for the
noncooperative game.
The aims of computing the Ramsey policy in this paper are twofold. First, we
need to obtain the Ramsey steady state around which the equilibrium conditions are
approximated. Second, we compute the welfare cost stemming from the inability to
cooperate under the (nonlinear) Ramsey framework. The welfare cost is computed
in the next section in a conventional manner following Lucas (1992) in terms of con-
sumption units.
3.2 Linear-Quadratic Framework
The characteristics of the optimal noncooperative monetary policy under LCP are not
easily understood from the optimality conditions of the Ramsey policy (as shown in
Appendix D). In this subsection, we derive the quadratic objective functions which
the central banks aim to minimize under LCP in a noncooperative game.
9Wang (2015) examines a set of choices as policy variables including PPI inflation rates, import price
inflation rates, CPI inflation rates, outputs and nominal interest rates in a two-country model with LCP.
When nominal interest rates are chosen to be the policy variables, equilibrium indeterminacy occurs.
This repeats the findings in Blake (2012), de Fiore and Liu (2002) and Coenen et al. (2010) although they
use different models with nominal rigidities from Wang (2015).
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Domestic welfare can be approximated up to the second order as
WH,t0 ≡ Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ − χ
h1+ωt
1 + ω
)
(3.1)
≈ Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0C1−σ
(
cˆt − hˆt + 1− σ2 cˆ
2
t −
1 + ω
2
hˆ2t
)
+ t.i.p + h.o.t,
where C is steady-state value of Ct, t.i.p and h.o.t denote the terms independent of
policy and higher order term than the second order, respectively. As shown by Kim
and Kim (2003) with a simple example, the existence of linear terms in the loss func-
tions leads to spurious welfare evaluation. Thus, these must be substituted out by
second-order terms.
In a closed economy, the log exact form of the resource constraint is given by
zt + hˆt = cˆt + ΔˆH,t.
Thus, as shown by Woodford (2003), the linear terms cˆt − hˆt are replaced by the price
dispersion terms −ΔˆH,t, which is of the second order and eventually replaced by the
quadratic term of inflation rates (see Appendix E).10
In open economies, linear terms cannot be easily substituted out as in the closed
economy. For example, under PCP with a logarithmic utility function, as shown in Fu-
jiwara, Kam, and Sunakawa (2015), the log exact form of the home resource constraint
is given by
zt + hˆt = − pˆH,t + cˆt + ΔˆH,t
= 2qˆt + cˆt + ΔˆH,t.
The linear terms cˆt− hˆt are now replaced by not only the price dispersion terms −ΔˆH,t
but also the terms of trade −qˆt which is absent in a closed economy. Thus, each cen-
tral bank in an open economy is incentivized to strategically manipulate the terms of
trade in its favor. This indeed represents the terms-of-trade externality as analyzed in
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Benigno (2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2006). Suther-
land (2002), Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno and Benigno (2006) substitute
out the linear terms by the quadratic terms by using the second-order approximation
to the structural equations including the aggregate supply conditions for correct wel-
fare comparison between cooperation and noncooperation.
We are not saying that the second-order approximation of the aggregate supply
conditions is always necessary in obtaining quadratic loss functions which central
banks under noncooperation aim to minimize. If policy institutions are equipped with
tools to manipulate the terms of trade in the steady state, such as taxes, or subsidies,
the remaining linear terms after the second-order approximation of social welfare can
be eliminated by strategic use of such policy instruments. In Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler
10Note that zt is independent of policy.
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(2002), governments strategically use sales subsidies in steady states in a noncooper-
ative game. As a result, the quadratic loss function under noncooperation is derived
without resort to the second-order approximation of the aggregate supply conditions.
This strategic manipulation of the terms of trade in the steady state, however, results
in different steady states between cooperation and noncooperation. This makes wel-
fare comparison non-trivial. In order to compare social welfare between cooperation
and noncooperation with respect to identical steady states, the second-order approxi-
mation technique proposed by Benigno and Woodford (2005) is employed. Note also
that in our model, only central banks are in a policy game and their instruments are
inflation rates, which do not affect the terms of trade in the steady state.
Under the cooperative regime, the sum of the linear terms of global welfare cˆt −
hˆt + cˆ∗t − hˆ∗t leads to the cancellation of the terms-of-trade term by using the log exact
form of the foreign resource constraint:
z∗t + hˆ∗t = −2qˆt + cˆ∗t + Δˆ∗F,t.
The terms–of–trade externality is internalized, by definition, under cooperation. Thus,
even with LCP, as shown by Engel (2011), social welfare under cooperation can be ap-
proximated up to the second order without resort to the second-order approximation
to the equilibrium conditions. Log-linear approximation to the resource constraints
in equations (vii) and (xxv) results in
zt + hˆt = ct +
ν
2
(−pH,t + ΔˆH,t)+ 2− ν2
(
−p∗H,t −
1
σ
eˆt + Δˆ∗H,t
)
,
z∗t + hˆ∗t = c∗t +
ν
2
(−p∗F,t + Δˆ∗F,t)+ 2− ν2
(
−pF,t + 1
σ
eˆt + ΔˆF,t
)
,
where the log exact forms of the demands in equations (iii), (xxi), (iv), (xxii) and the
risk sharing condition in equation (xxxvii) are substituted. Together with the log exact
forms of equations (v) and (xxiii), we can derive
cˆt − hˆt + cˆ∗t − hˆ∗t = −
ν
2
ΔˆH,t − 2− ν2 Δˆ
∗
H,t −
ν
2
Δˆ∗F,t −
2− ν
2
ΔˆF,t.
Thus, central banks under cooperation aim to stabilize fluctuations in four inflation
rates: πH,t π∗H,t, π
∗
F,t and πF,t. Appendix E shows how to transform price dispersions
into inflation rates.
Under the noncooperative regime and LCP, linear terms for the terms of trade can-
not be eliminated. Thus, they need to be substituted out by the second-order approx-
imation to AS equations under the assumption of commitment, resource constraints
and price dispersions. Details of how linear terms can be replaced by quadratic terms
are shown in Appendix E.
Upon obtaining the quadratic expressions for the linear terms, the loss function
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that the home central bank aims to minimize is then given by
Lt0 =
1
2
Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0

(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)2 + e4δ
(
1 +
α
γ
) [
νπ2H,t + (2− ν) π2F,t
]
+
e
4δ
(
1− α
γ
) [
ν
(
π∗F,t
)2
+ (2− ν) (π∗H,t)2]
+
ν (2− ν)
8
(
1 +
σ + ω (ν− 1)
γ
)(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)2
+
ν (2− ν)
8
(
1− σ + ω (ν− 1)
γ
)(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)2
+ (σ− 1)
[
1− (σ− 1) (2− ν) (ων + 1)
2γ
] (
yˆt − 2− ν2 qˆt +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
+
(σ− 1)2 (2− ν) (ων + 1)
2γ
(
yˆ∗t −
2− ν
2
qˆ∗t −
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2σ
eˆt
)2
+
ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
4γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2
+
ν (2− ν) (σ− 1 + ω + 2ν)
4γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν) (−σ + 1 + ω)
4γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
(
pˆF,t − 1
σ
eˆt − pˆ∗F,t
)]2
−ν (2− ν)
(
σ− 1 + ω + 2ν
)
4γ
[
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν2
(
pˆ∗H,t +
1
σ
eˆt − pˆH,t
)]2

,
where α ≡ ω + 1 + (1− σ) (1− ν), γ ≡ σνω (2− ν) + σ + ω (1− ν)2, and δ ≡
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ . Since we assume two symmetric countries, only the loss function which
the domestic central bank aims to minimize is shown.
The expressions of the loss functions are simplified and more intuitive when we
set σ = 1. Note that as discussed in Appendix A, international spillovers exist under
LCP even when σ = 1 so imposing this restriction does not mean the absence of gains
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from cooperation. When σ = 1, the domestic central bank aims to minimize
Lt0 =
1
2
Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0

(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)2 + e2δ
[
νπ2H,t + (2− ν) π2F,t
]
+
ν (2− ν) Ω
4
dˆ2t +
ν (2− ν) (1−Ω)
4
(
dˆ∗t
)2
+
ν (1−Ω)
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν2 dˆt
)2
+
(2− ν) Ω
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
−ν (1−Ω)
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
− (2− ν) Ω
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν2 dˆt
)2

, (3.2)
where Ω ≡ 1+ω ν21+ω and 0 < Ω 6 1.
Equation (3.2) shows that the noncooperative loss function of each policy maker
under LCP consists of nine quadratic terms. The first terms, quadratic deviations
from the steady state of output (employment), represent inefficient fluctuations in
output and therefore consumption stemming from markup fluctuations in the real-
ization of productivity shocks, which hinder consumption smoothing; the second and
third terms, squared inflation rates of local as well as imported products, arise from
staggered price contracts, which create price dispersions; the fourth and fifth terms
are the direct consequences of the breakdown of the law of one price; the final four
terms, as explained in Appendix A, represent inefficient fluctuations in real marginal
costs, which lead to fluctuations in both PPI and import price inflation rates. The signs
associated with those terms represent the national central bank’s incentives to simul-
taneously stabilize inflation rates relevant to its own country and destabilize those
relevant to the other country.
Table 4 compares the loss functions under LCP and noncooperation to those under
(1) PCP and cooperation, (2) PCP and noncooperation, and (3) LCP and cooperation.
We start the comparison given LCP (Table 4, column 2). The first five terms in the
noncooperative loss functions, in equation (3.2), are also those in the cooperative loss
functions. The last four terms regarding fluctuations in real marginal costs, repre-
senting the terms-of-trade externality, are unique to the noncooperative policy mak-
ers. The existence of the additional terms indicates national policy makers’ additional
concern for stabilization of inflation rates in both goods categories. Under LCP, that
means gains from stabilization of CPI inflation rates.
Then, we compare column 2 to column 1. The number of objectives (trade-offs)
that policy makers aim to minimize is substantially reduced from LCP to PCP, re-
gardless of the nature of strategic games. The key to understanding this difference is
that the law of one price, which holds only under PCP, renders (a) price dispersions
within export goods identical to those within locally produced and consumed goods;
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Table 4: Quadratic loss functions under PCP / LCP and under cooperation / nonco-
operation
PCP LCP
Cooperation
(1 + ω)
[
(yˆt − zt)2 + (yˆ∗t − z∗t )2
]
+
e
δ
[
π2H,t +
(
π∗F,t
)2]
(1 + ω)
[
(yˆt − zt)2 + (yˆ∗t − z∗t )2
]
+
eν
2δ
[
π2H,t +
(
π∗F,t
)2]
+
e (2− ν)
2δ
[
π2F,t +
(
π∗H,t
)2]
+
ν (2− ν)
4
[
dˆ2t +
(
dˆ∗t
)2]
Noncooperation
(Home)
(1 + ω) ν
2
(yˆt − zt)2
+
(1 + ω) (2− ν)
2
(yˆ∗t − z∗t )2
+
eν
2δ
π2H,t +
e (2− ν)
2δ
(
π∗F,t
)2
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)2 + e2δ
[
νπ2H,t + (2− ν) π2F,t
]
+
ν (2− ν) Ω
4
dˆ2t +
ν (2− ν) (1−Ω)
4
(
dˆ∗t
)2
+
ν (1−Ω)
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν2 dˆt
)2
+
(2− ν) Ω
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
− ν (1−Ω)
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
− (2− ν) Ω
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν2 dˆt
)2
Noncooperation
(Foreign)
(1 + ω) ν
2
(yˆ∗t − z∗t )2
+
(1 + ω) (2− ν)
2
(yˆt − zt)2
+
eν
2δ
(
π∗F,t
)2
+
e (2− ν)
2δ
π2H,t
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )2 +
e
2δ
[
ν
(
π∗F,t
)2
+ (2− ν) (π∗H,t)2]
+
ν (2− ν) Ω
4
(
dˆ∗t
)2
+
ν (2− ν) (1−Ω)
4
dˆ2t
+
ν (1−Ω)
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t ) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
+
(2− ν) Ω
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt)− ν2 dˆt
)2
− ν (1−Ω)
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆt − zt) + 2− ν2 dˆt
)2
− (2− ν) Ω
2
(
(1 + ω) (yˆ∗t − z∗t )−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
)2
Note: we present the period loss functions in the Table. The loss function of each policy maker is the present discounted value
of the sum of current and expected future period loss functions.
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(b) dˆt = dˆ∗t = 0 by definition; and (c) stabilization of real marginal costs is in line
with stabilization of output fluctuations. Therefore, the additional trade-offs regard-
ing fluctuations in real marginal costs that separate the noncooperative loss functions
from the cooperative ones under LCP no longer exist under PCP. Allocations and
prices under both games coincide under PCP.11
Quadratic loss functions are minimized by the central banks subject to the lin-
earized equilibrium conditions, whose detailed derivation is shown in Appendix A.
They are the constraint relating to cross country output difference:
yˆt − yˆ∗t +
ν
2
pˆH,t +
2− ν
2
pˆ∗H,t −
(ν− 1)
σ
eˆt − ν2 pˆ
∗
F,t −
2− ν
2
pˆF,t = 0, (3.3)
the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curves:
πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 + δ
[
(σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt + (2− ν) (1− σ)2 (qˆt + eˆt) +
2− ν
2
dˆt
]
, (3.4)
πF,t = βEtπF,t+1 + δ
[
(σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆ∗t − eˆt)−
ν
2
dˆ∗t
]
, (3.5)
π∗F,t = βEtπ∗F,t+1 + δ
[
(σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆ∗t − eˆt) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t
]
, (3.6)
π∗H,t = βEtπ∗H,t+1 + δ
[
(σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt + (2− ν) (1− σ)2 (qˆt + eˆt)−
ν
2
dˆt
]
, (3.7)
where qˆt = pˆF,t − eˆt − pˆ∗H,t, qˆ∗t = eˆt + pˆ∗H,t − pˆF,t, dˆt = pˆ∗H,t + eˆt − pˆH,t, and dˆ∗t =
pˆF,t − eˆt − pˆ∗F,t, as well as the relations between inflation rates and relative prices from
detrending the system:
πH,t = πt + pˆH,t − pˆH,t−1, (3.8)
π∗H,t = π
∗
t + p
∗
H,t − pˆ∗H,t−1, (3.9)
πF,t = πt + pˆF,t − pˆF,t−1, (3.10)
π∗F,t = π
∗
t + pˆ
∗
F,t − pˆ∗F,t−1, (3.11)
and definitions of aggregate price indexes:
ν
2
pˆH,t +
2− ν
2
pˆF,t = 0, (3.12)
2− ν
2
pˆ∗H,t +
ν
2
pˆ∗F,t = 0. (3.13)
Under noncooperation, the domestic central bank minimizes (3.2) subject to equa-
tions (3.3)-(3.13), given foreign PPI inflation rates {π∗F,t} for all t ≥ t0. The foreign
central bank faces similar minimization problem given domestic PPI inflation rates
{πH,t} for all t ≥ t0. Each central bank conducts optimal commitment policy from the
timeless perspective as in Woodford (2003).
11Note that the arguments here are valid with Cobb-Douglas preferences between home and foreign
goods, which is assumed throughout this paper.
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Note that under PCP, the law of one price holds, thus
dˆt = dˆ∗t = 0.
Consequently,
pˆH,t = eˆt + pˆ∗H,t,
pˆF,t = eˆt + pˆ∗F,t.
3.2.1 No Home Bias
When there is no home bias, aggregate consumption in both countries becomes iden-
tical with complete markets and the real exchange rate is always unity. As a result,
dˆt = dˆ∗t = 0. The loss function greatly simplifies and becomes identical under coop-
erative and noncooperative regimes:
Lt0 = L
∗
t0 =
1
2
LWt0 =
1
4
Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0

(1 + ω)
[
(yˆt − zt)2 + (yˆ∗t − z∗t )2
]
+
σ− 1
2
(yˆt + yˆ∗t )
2 +
e
δ
[
π2H,t +
(
π∗F,t
)2]
 .
4 Results
In this section, we first draw impulse responses of the two countries to a positive
technology shock to the home country. The dynamics are obtained under the optimal
monetary policy in Section 3.2. We consider cooperative and noncooperative games
under both PCP and LCP. As discussed in previous section, cooperative and nonco-
operative allocations and prices coincide under PCP. We then compute welfare gains
from cooperation using the Ramsey policy problem presented in Section 3.1.
4.1 Impulse Responses
The baseline parameters are calibrated as in Table 5. β, χ and the probability of not
being able to reset prices θ are set at the conventional values. ν is set at 1.5 as in
Engel (2011) which means that households put 3/4 of the weight on consumption
of domestic goods in utility. σ usually takes the range from 1 to 5. We set it to 1,
consistent with our derivation of simplified loss functions in previous section. The
elasticity of substitution among different varieties within goods category is set at 7.66.
Empirical data show that the range of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity 1/ω is 0.05-
0.3 so we set ω at 4.71 in the range. Note that Engel (2011) assumes a linear disutility
of labor, ω = 0, which later we will show to be a special case in which welfare gains
from cooperation are zero. In addition, the log-technology follows an AR(1) stochastic
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Table 5: Parameter values (Baseline)
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
θ 0.75
Probability of a firm not being chosen to reset its prices at each
period
e 7.66
Elasticity of substitution among different products within goods
category
ν 1.5
Weight that households put on consumption of domestic goods
in utility (ν/2)
σ 1
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption
χ 1 Coefficient associated with disutility of labor
ω 4.71 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity
process with serial correlation ρ set at 0.856 and standard deviation at 0.0064.12
Figure 1 depicts the impulse responses under PCP and under LCP to a one–standard–deviation
positive technology shock to the home country (we scale up the impulse responses by
100 so the dynamics in Figure 1 are measured in per cent). In response to technology
improvement shocks, optimal policy is always expansionary in the country experienc-
ing such shocks and contractionary in the country without shocks. Specific to results
in Figure 1, it means a (nominal and) real exchange rate depreciation for the home
country.
Under PCP, optimal policy leads to efficient responses of output and fully stabi-
lizes PPI inflation rates, in response to efficient shocks. A one standard deviation
technology shocks in the domestic country leads to an increase of home output by
0.64 per cent. With the efficient response of output, optimal policy is able to fully sta-
bilize PPI inflation rates in both countries. Imported goods prices then fluctuate with
exchange rates while changes in CPI inflation rates reflect changes in import price in-
flation rates proportionately (the proportion is equal to the weight of imported goods
in the consumption basket, i.e. 25%). The home terms of trade weaken with the
real depreciation. Foreign output stays unchanged when σ = 1 because there are no
spillovers.
Under LCP and cooperation, optimal policy trades higher output for more stable
CPI inflation rates. Specifically, a one standard deviation shock to home productivity
now leads to an increase of home output by less than 0.64 per cent, which translates
into a fall in PPI inflation rates of the home country. The real exchange rate depre-
ciation under LCP leads to an improvement of the home terms of trade, raising the
real purchasing power of the home country at any given price level. Thus demand
for both goods rises and foreign output increases to meet the higher demand. CPI in-
flation rates of both countries are stabilized to a much larger extent by optimal policy
12For the range of σ, see Benigno and Benigno (2006), for the range of ω, see Erceg, Gust, and Lopez-
Salido (2007), and for technology calibration, see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a positive technology shock to the home country
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under LCP than under PCP.
Under LCP and noncooperation, optimal policy seeks to stabilize CPI inflation
rates more so than it does under cooperation, as demonstrated by the additional terms
in the noncooperative loss functions in Section 3.2. As a trade-off, home output in-
creases less than it does under cooperation and home PPI inflation rates fall further.
Optimal policy is less expansionary in the home country and thus the real exchange
rate depreciates less under noncooperation than under cooperation. The home terms
of trade deteriorate and the foreign terms of trade improve, compared to their respec-
tive cooperative positions. For any given price level, foreign consumers’ demand for
foreign goods increases and foreign output rises further accordingly.13
4.2 Welfare Cost
The welfare cost from noncooperation is measured in consumption units by Lucas
(1992). Specifically, the welfare cost measures the proportion of aggregate consump-
tion that a representative household has to give up so that it is as well-off under the
cooperative regime as under the noncooperative regime. Use the superscript “c” and
“n” to denote the cooperative game and noncooperative game, respectively. Follow-
ing Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), λc is the welfare cost from noncooperation for
the home representative household and we have
WnH,t0 = Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [u ((1− λc) Cct )− v (hct)] .
When σ = 1,
WnH,t0 = Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
log [(1− λc) Cct ]− χ
(hct)
1+ω
1 + ω
)
,
thus λc is given by
λc = 1− exp (1− β)
(
WnH,t0 −WcH,t0
)
,
where WcH,t0 and W
n
H,t0 are the present discounted value of the lifetime utility of the
home representative household under cooperation and noncooperation, respectively,
as defined in equation (2.1). When σ 6= 1,
WnH,t0 = Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
[(1− λc) Cct ]1−σ
1− σ − χ
(hct)
1+ω
1 + ω
)
,
13In Appendix B, we compare optimal responses between cooperation and noncooperation to a pref-
erence shock. Similarly to the case with the technology shock examined here, the differences between
cooperation and noncooperation are not significant.
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Figure 2: Welfare costs from noncooperation (%)
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thus λc is given by
λc = 1−
(
WnH,t0 + H
c
t0
Cct0
) 1
1−σ
,
where Cct0 ≡ Et0 ∑∞t=t0 βt−t0
(Cct )
1−σ
1−σ and H
c
t0 ≡ Et0 ∑∞t=t0 βt−t0χ
(hct )
1+ω
1+ω are the present
discounted value of the home representative household’s lifetime stream of consump-
tion and working hours under cooperative policy, respectively, and WnH,t0 is the present
discounted value of the lifetime utility of the home representative household under
noncooperative policy.
We apply the second-order perturbation method to the nonlinear model in Section
3.1 to compute WcH,t0 and W
n
H,t0 as unconditional welfare to the technology shock pro-
cess estimated in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).14 The left panel of Figure 2 depicts
the welfare cost from noncooperation of the home country as functions of ν and σ
for 0 ≤ ν ≤ 2 and σ = 1, 3, 5 when ω = 4.71.15 The right panel of Figure 2 depicts
the three-dimension figures of the welfare cost from noncooperation as functions of ν
and σ for 0 ≤ ν ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ σ ≤ 5 when ω = 4.71. The remaining parameters are
calibrated as in Table 5.
In the baseline parameterization as shown by the line of σ = 1 in Figure 2, the
estimated mean of the welfare cost from noncooperation is λc = 0.037% in response
to a positive home technology shock of one standard deviation. It means that the
home households under the cooperative optimal policy have to give up 0.037 per cent
of their consumption to be as well-off as under the noncooperative regime. Figures 2
shows that in general there exist nonzero gains from cooperation under LCP. Welfare
14We develop our code in Dynare and execute it in MATLAB. Code is available upon request.
15Under complete market, welfare costs are identical for both home and foreign country. Thus, we
only show figures for the domestic country.
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gains from cooperation are largest under σ = 1 even though the two countries are
insular in structural equations under PCP. Overall, the size of the gain is relatively
small, though not negligible. These results imply that in order to have large welfare
gains from cooperation, frictions other than nominal rigidities or other shocks must
be considered.
There are two special cases in which gains from cooperation under LCP become
zero: 1) consumption preferences exhibit no home bias, ν = 1 and closed economy,
ν = 0 or 2; and 2) disutility of labor becomes linear, i.e. ω = 0. The former makes the
two countries identical in every aspect or reduce to closed economies. In particular,
when there is no home bias, as mentioned in Engel (2011), there exists no trade-off
between eliminating distortions from the breakdown of the law of one price and the
inefficient output fluctuations. The latter eliminates the costs stemming from fluctu-
ating labor and therefore output, which are the sources of the deviations from the law
of one price as a determinant of real marginal costs.
5 Conclusion
This paper finds that there exist gains from cooperation with optimal monetary policy
under LCP in response to technology shocks. A two-country DSGE model is devel-
oped in the paper and a linear-quadratic approach is adopted to obtain the quadratic
loss functions of noncooperative policy makers. The paper shows that noncoopera-
tive policy makers under LCP face extra trade-offs regarding stabilizing real marginal
costs induced by deviations from the law of one price. Optimal monetary policy seeks
to stabilize CPI inflation rates more so than it does under cooperation. Also, our study
suggests that as long as nominal rigidities are the sole distortions in the economy,
gains from cooperation are not sizable.
This paper follows Engel (2011) in the optimal monetary policy analysis. One of
the strong assumptions of the model is a complete assets market. Corsetti, Dedola,
and Leduc (2010) review the development in the NOEM literature and point out that
a complete assets market is a highly restrictive assumption which prohibits investiga-
tions of inefficiencies other than nominal rigidities. Given the findings in this paper, it
would be interesting to investigate the welfare implication of optimal monetary pol-
icy under LCP and the incomplete assets market with different timing assumptions of
asset trades, as examined in Engel (2016) and Senay and Sutherland (2007, 2013).
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A Log-Linearized Equations
We approximate the structural equations in Table 2 around the deterministic steady
state up to the first order. Note that the deterministic steady state is efficient as mo-
nopolistic distortion in production is effectively eliminated by an appropriate sub-
sidy. Thus, this deterministic steady state coincides with the Ramsey steady state,
which will be discussed in the following section.16 Details of the derivation of the
steady state are also shown in Appendix C. Below, the circumflex ˆ indicates the log-
deviation of a variable from its respective steady state.
Linear approximation to equations (xi) to (xiii), (xxxii) to (xxxiv), (xxix) to (xxxi)
and (xiv) to (xvi) leads to the New Keynesian Phillips curves:
πH,t = βEtπH,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(m̂ct − pˆH,t) , (A.1)
π∗F,t = βEtπ
∗
F,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(
m̂c∗t − pˆ∗F,t
)
, (A.2)
πF,t = βEtπF,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(
m̂c∗t − pˆF,t + eˆt
)
, (A.3)
π∗H,t = βEtπ
∗
H,t+1 +
(1− βθ) (1− θ)
θ
(
m̂ct − pˆ∗H,t − eˆt
)
. (A.4)
As in the closed-economy model of Galı´ and Gertler (1999) or the open-economy
model under PCP of Benigno and Benigno (2006), in equations (A.1) and (A.2), PPI in-
flation rates depend on real marginal costs that producers face when setting prices for
the domestic market. Equations (A.3) and (A.4), appearing specifically in the open-
economy model under LCP, show that import price inflation rates depend on real
marginal costs that producers face when setting prices for the importing country’s
market.17
First-order approximation to equations (ix) to (x) and (xvii) to (xviii) results in
ΔˆH,t = Δˆ∗H,t = Δˆ
∗
F,t = ΔˆF,t = 0.
Together with linearly approximated equations (ii) to (viii), (xx) to (xxvi), and (xxxvii),
16As Woodford (2003), Chapter 6 argues, this type of the steady state is the one that is appropriate
for ranking alternative policies. See also Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Khan, King, and Wolman
(2003).
17Note that MCtpH,t =
NMCt
PH,t
is the marginal cost evaluated at output price level while MCt = NMCtPt is
the marginal cost evaluated at consumer price level. The former is relevant to firms’ pricing decisions.
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we have
m̂ct − pˆH,t = (σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt + (2− ν) (1− σ)2 (qˆt + eˆt) +
2− ν
2
dˆt, (A.5)
m̂c∗t − pˆ∗F,t = (σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆ∗t − eˆt) +
2− ν
2
dˆ∗t , (A.6)
m̂c∗t − pˆF,t + eˆt = (σ + ω) yˆ∗t − (1 + ω) z∗t +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆ∗t − eˆt)−
ν
2
dˆ∗t , (A.7)
m̂ct − pˆ∗H,t − eˆt = (σ + ω) yˆt − (1 + ω) zt +
(2− ν) (1− σ)
2
(qˆt + eˆt)− ν2 dˆt, (A.8)
where qˆt and qˆ∗t denote log deviations of the domestic and foreign terms of trade from
their steady states:
Qt ≡ PF,tStP∗H,t
=
pF,t
et p∗H,t
, (A.9)
Q∗t ≡
StP∗H,t
PF,t
=
et p∗H,t
pF,t
, (A.10)
and dˆt and dˆ∗t denote those of the deviations from the law of one price:
Dt ≡
StP∗H,t
PH,t
=
et p∗H,t
pH,t
, (A.11)
D∗t ≡
PF
StP∗F,t
=
pF,t
et p∗F,t
. (A.12)
Equations (3.4)-(3.7) are derived by substituting equations (A.5)-(A.8) into equations
(A.1)-(A.4).
Equations (A.5) to (A.8) show that, in open economies, deviations from the steady
state of real marginal costs are not only proportional to deviations from the steady
state of output, but also depend on relative prices. The first and the second terms are
those also included in New Keynesian models in closed economies. The third and
the fourth terms appear only in open economies. Specifically, the third terms capture
interdependence: economic activities abroad affect the domestic economy via inter-
national relative prices. The qualitative impacts depend on σ. When σ > 1 (σ < 1),
positive changes in the international relative prices have negative (positive) impacts
on real marginal costs. When σ = 1, the spillovers are zero. Note that the transmis-
sion mechanism of such spillovers differs under PCP and LCP. Under PCP, the real
exchange rate moves in proportion to the terms of trade of the home country. A de-
terioration of the terms of trade, associated with a real exchange rate depreciation,
has two opposing effects: it increases consumption through the global assets market
and therefore increases marginal costs; it decreases consumption due to higher im-
port prices and therefore decreases marginal costs. According to the terminologies
by Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (2002) for PCP, the former is called the risk-sharing ef-
fect while the latter is called the terms-of-trade effect. When σ > 1 (σ < 1), the latter
(former) dominates or, in other words, the home and foreign goods are Edgeworth
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substitutes (complements). When σ = 1, the two effects are canceled out and the two
countries become insular. Under LCP, on the other hand, consumer prices of the im-
ported goods are inelastic to movements in exchange rates and thus changes in the
terms of trade do not entail expenditure-switching effect as under PCP. Consumption
and real marginal costs are less responsive to the international relative prices rep-
resented by the third terms.18 A depreciation of the real exchange rate leads to an
improvement of the home terms of trade under LCP due to increases in the home-
currency denominated revenues from export sales. It is deviations from the law of
one price that affect real marginal costs under LCP, which are the fourth terms. Equa-
tions (A.5) and (A.8) illustrate that deviations from the law of one price for the home
goods increase (decrease) real marginal costs that firms face when selling the home
goods domestically (abroad), ceteris paribus. Changes in marginal costs in turn lead to
PPI inflation at home (import price deflation abroad), via the New Keynesian Phillips
curves in equations (A.1) and (A.4). As will be shown later, these terms are also ob-
jectives to be minimized by noncooperative policy makers under LCP. Note that the
spillovers on marginal costs represented by the fourth terms exist independently of
goods’ substitutability or complementarity, that is whether σ is greater, smaller or
equal to 1.
Log-linearization to the aggregate resource constraints in equations (vii) and (xxv),
and the risk sharing condition in equation (xxxvii) gives equation (3.3). Also, we have
log exact deviations for the definitions of inflation rates in equations (v), (xvii), (xviii),
(xxiii), (xxxv) and (xxxvi), which are equations (3.8)-(3.13).
18See also Corsetti and Pesenti (2005b) for a discussion in a one-period ahead price adjustment model
under LCP and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) for a discussion focusing on effects of international
relative prices on consumption.
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B Preference Shock
Although our primal focus is how optimal responses are different between coopera-
tion and noncooperation to the technology shock, let us here examine another efficient
shock. In particular, we draw impulse responses to a preference shock examined in
Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010). In this case, domestic welfare is given by
Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
exp(ζt)
C1−σt − 1
1− σ − χ
h1+ωt
1 + ω
)
,
where ζt denotes the preference shock. Using the calibration in Corsetti, Dedola, and
Leduc (2010), it is assumed to follow an AR(1) stochastic process with serial correla-
tion 0.95 and standard deviation at 0.01. Figure 3 below illustrates the impulse re-
sponses to one standard deviation of a positive preference shock to the home country
(we scale up the impulse responses by 100).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a positive preference shock to the home country
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Responses are not identical between cooperation and noncooperation, implying
that there exist gains from cooperation in the presence of the preference shock. The
differences between cooperation and noncooperation are, however, not significant as
is the case with the technology shock examined in Section 4.
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